Risk & Progress| A hub for essays that explore risk, human progress, and your potential. My mission is to educate, inspire, and invest in concepts that promote a better future. Subscriptions are free, paid subscribers gain access to the full archive, including the Pathways of Progress and Realize essay series.
In 19th century Britain, shortly after the introduction of some of the first “automobiles,” its Parliament passed the Red Flag Act. This law required a crew of three to operate all autos; one person for fueling, another to drive, and one more walking ahead of the vehicle waving a red flag to warn others as it plodded forward at 2 mph. Ostensibly a safety regulation in the public’s interest, in reality, the “The Red Flag Act” resulted from intense lobbying from the stagecoach industry, which was threatened by the invention. The Act stifled Britain's nascent auto industry; ideas only flower when allowed room to grow.
As we learned at the outset of our study of human progress, we are biologically predisposed to risk aversion. We have great difficulty weighing risk through the lens of our innate “reality distortion field.” Thus, we tend to give great deference to rules and regulations created under claims of “safety” and “security.” Often, as we have seen, this “precautionary principle” causes more harm than benefit. I previously noted a few examples, including environmental regulations that are so draconian they block the installation of green energy and drug qualifications procedures so onerous that many die while awaiting approval.
Many acknowledge the harms of over-regulation, but like the mythical Hydra, every time we attempt reform by cutting off a head, two others grow in its place. If allowed to continue unchecked, the accumulation of non-functional regulations and expansion of the state threatens human progress by putting a ceiling on our potential future. Indeed, I have already made the case that overregulation of energy, particularly nuclear power, may have contributed to the apparent slowdown in innovation after 1970, what I call our “lost future.” When every three-letter department becomes a gatekeeper, we all become prisoners. When there are more refs than players, the game is not playable.
Streamlining the State
If, as I have held, we must view the economy and society as one huge “social supercomputer,” then the laws and regulations created by the government are functionally its “operating system.” As with your home computer, bloated software leads to poor performance, no matter how good the underlying hardware is. We need government because we need structure to solve collective action problems, but it doesn’t need to be expansive and oppressive to effectively serve this purpose. Famed economist Milton Friedman held that government serves three core functions:
To prevent people from preying on or harming each other: This includes establishing an army for defense, police at home, and courts for dispute resolution.
To foster competitive and open markets: Establishing and enforcing property rights and writing the “rules of the game.”
Address “neighborhood” effects: This means dealing with negative externalities, what I called the “pricing input” data into the social supercomputer.
I believe, however, that a pro-progress government has two more functions:
To promote idea creation and the accumulation/diffusion of knowledge: This entails building an effective education and IP system. It may also include pro-natal policies to establish more “nodes” for the supercomputer,
To establish a basic social insurance system: These would be basic “safety nets,” including health, disability, unemployment, and retirement insurance.
The government should also adhere to two basic principles:
Minimal Intrusion: Execute the above at the lowest cost and using the least coercion possible.
Subsidiarity: All decisions should be made at most local levels of government as reasonably possible.
The devil, of course, is in the details. In the coming essays, we will address these core government functions. We will discuss, for example, the merits of Pigouvian taxation on sugar-sweetened beverages and fossil fuels, to correct the data inputs that feed into our '“social supercomputer.” We will discuss ways to enhance idea creation and knowledge dissemination. I suggest, for example, using vouchers to fund general education and equity (as opposed to debt) for higher education. We will also review a more limited Intellectual Property system that balances investment incentives with allocative efficiency for optimal knowledge creation and dissemination. We will also take on entitlements, exploring pathways to reform healthcare and pensions. The goal is to return these programs to their core “social insurance” functions. I will also visit ways to streamline the tax code, paring back 10 million words to a few pages of simple text.
Minimal Intrusion
This essay, however, focuses on the principle of minimal intrusion and regulation. Despite attempts to curb the excess, the regulatory thicket has grown ever more suffocating. President Reagan was the first to attempt to stymie regulatory bloat, signing an executive order that allowed new regulations only if “the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs….” This was the first time cost/benefit analysis became a prerequisite for implementing new rules. Reagan’s order, however, applied only to newly created regulations, not existing ones. The Obama administration took this further by requiring government agencies to routinely review rules and “determine whether any such regulations should be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed.”
These reforms have failed. Since Reagan’s Presidency, the Code of Federal Regulations, seen above, has swelled from 100,000 to 190,000 pages. In 1950, it was just 10,000 pages. Similarly, the US tax code has become an order of magnitude more complex, rising from a length of 1.4 million words in 1955, to over 10 million by 2010. The pessimist would agree that every new layer of complexity adds opportunities for graft and rent-seeking, but even the optimist would acknowledge that growing complexity requires the wasteful expense of billions of human hours and dollars complying with the law. This is human and financial capital that would be better spent doing other things.
The challenge is one of asymmetry: While governments can create rules and regulations, they lack a robust mechanism to review, modify, or delete them after they go into effect. These rules accumulate, one upon the other, until inertia and stagnation become the norm, like free radicals slowly damaging the body. Experience from President Obama’s executive order suggests that we need an independent body to identify, delete, or correct existing regulations. The agencies that draft the rules cannot do this themselves because they lack the proper incentives and objectivity.
This body, perhaps authorized by Congress, would review all existing regulations. Those deemed “functional” would be maintained and those deemed “non-functional” would be modified or deleted. How do we differentiate between “functional” and “nonfunctional” regulations? To answer this, I look to the definition proposed by Patrick McLaughlin, a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. He defines functional rules as those that address current, significant risks, mitigate those risks, and do not have significant unintended effects or excessive compliance costs relative to their benefits.
This review board should also be bequeathed with the ability to review occupational licensing rules. As we have seen, occupational licensing is often an instrument of rent-seeking masquerading as health and safety protection. As with any regulation, we should judge their effectiveness on their merits and de-license occupations that pose no material health or safety risks to the public. Remember, for occupations with moderate risk, there is an alternative to licensing: certification. Certification reduces opportunities for rent-seeking because it’s conducted by non-profits, and unlike licensure, the uncertified are not barred from the market. Only occupations deemed too great a risk to delicense would remain so. Even then, however, licensure requirements should be harmonized across borders. An individual’s skills and knowledge do not evaporate when he/she moves from California to Texas. Yet, many licenses are not currently portable or transferable in this way.
To make these reviews easier in the future, all new laws and regulations should come with a clear statement of purpose that specifies what the rule intends to achieve (e.g. lower crime rates, reduced asthma deaths…etc.), so the review terms are known in advance. All new rules should also have an automatic sunset provision after five years. This reorients the burden; shifting the default stance from rule accumulation to deletion, forcing regulators to justify rule continuation and providing an opportunity to delete or improve those that fail to achieve their stated purpose. The goal is minimal intrusion; to keep laws and regulations simple and their numbers as low as reasonably possible. Additionally, as I will explore later, we could design government such that it’s possible to challenge any law or regulation on its merits at any time.
Our overarching goal is to strike a delicate balance. We must ensure that our rules and regulations are robust enough to create and sustain modern civilization, but not overbearing such that they stifle human progress or imperil economic growth. To date, we have strayed too close to the latter. We must build a streamlined state that readily adapts, able to modify or delete the very rules it created based on evidence and data. This protopian model of governance would be a game-changer; accelerating growth and stoking the full potential of humanity.
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This is a great article. What a great place to start. It contains a potentially good idea and it inspires discussion around improving government laws and policies. Regan created a DOGE equivalent that resulted in no benefits. Will the DOGE be any different? Time will tell what those changes are and if they are beneficial.
I love the idea of a Substack devoted to positive ideas for improvement. I recently became a subscriber of your Substack so I haven't read your introductory articles. That's the problem with articles vs. writing a book where you can introduce small chunks in the right order that build on each other meaningfully.
Regardless, this is a broad topic and I think we should start at the beginning. The objective is to create the best laws and policies, right? But what does "best" mean? Those that benefit the power elite who finance the major elections and control the political parties who in turn control the government for their benefit? (A Cambridge study covering a 20-year period demonstrated that laws and policies benefit the elite and their special interest businesses, not the people or collective interests.) Or should they benefit the people? What are the problems we are trying to solve (our solution requirements) and how do we know when we're successful?
Second, there are those who make the decisions (currently the political parties for those who control them) and those who administer those decisions (also controlled by the political parties). Who would make the best decision makers and who would make the best administrators?
Third, this article and most people including business executives and management assume that the best person for a decision should make a decision, which is the one in authority or an "expert." But in reality, there are three types of decisions: one-time-only decisions, coordinated decisions (projects with dependencies), and repetitive decisions. Repetitive decisions are called processes. By developing the best standardized process for a desired result, we don't have to make the same decision repeatedly in many different ways by different people. We can optimize how it is made, fix it if the process is broken, and build in error handling. Why wouldn't the decisions made in laws and policies be part of a solutioning processes instead of a one-time-only decision? What if the process had multiple steps and used the best decision makers for that type of issue?
And finally, the process must ensure that those who have great power and influence do not have the ability to skew the results in their favor as they do now. Would all of this be possible? Yes, there is a blueprint that would fix these issues by changing two federal processes.
I look forward to your future discussions in this broad area. And being somewhat gullable, I will be looking to your more critical commenters to help me keep things in perspective. :-)
In regard to "All new rules should also have an automatic sunset provision after five years."
I am glad you added that but thought it should have been in the1st or 2nd paragraph after your CFR graphic. Initially I thought perhaps we could let Congress decide on the sunset period between 5 and (say) 10 years, giving them some input into how long they wanted to experiment with a given general legal area or specific act. But when considering it from the point of the agency's bureaucrats creating these rules, then a 5 year "prove it or lose it" attitude makes sense. Plus, tying up some of them in justifying prior rules and regs means they have less time trying to create new ones.
But will this also require some streamlining of the usual comment period for new rules and regs? With the possibility of rules being sunsetted in 5 years, some comment period objections might be overridden by "let's see how it works out" becasue it is not cast in stone forever?